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Abstract
It is still a matter of controversy whether the Principle of the Com-
mon Cause (PCC) can be used as a basis for sound causal inference.
It is thus to be expected that its application to quantum mechanics
should be a correspondingly controversial issue. Indeed the early 90’s
saw a flurry of papers addressing just this issue in connection with the
EPR correlations. Yet, that debate does not seem to have caught up
with the most recent literature on causal inference generally, which has
moved on to consider the virtues of a generalised PCC-inspired con-
dition, the so-called Causal Markov Condition (CMC). In this paper
we argue that the CMC is an appropriate tool for debating possible
causal explanations of the EPR correlations. But we also take issue
with some pronouncements on EPR by defenders of the CMC.
Contents
1 Introduction 2
2 EPR and Quantum Correlations 4
3 Redhead’s Robustness 5
4 Healey on Robustness 7
5 The Causal Markov Condition 9
6 Robustness and the Causal Markov Condition 10
7 EPR and the Causal Markov Condition 12
8 Conclusions 18
Bibliography 19
∗Draft - please do not circulate or quote witout authors’ permission. Research towards
this paper has been funded by project HUM2005-01787-C01-03 of the Spanish Ministry
of Education and Science, and we would like to thank the members of its associated 2005
reading group on causal inference.
1
1 Introduction
Questions regarding the status of causation in quantum mechanics are as
ancient as the discipline itself. The founding parents of quantum mechanics
often identified causation with determinism and consequently understood
the emergence of the fundamentally probabilistic quantum mechanics as the
demise of a causal picture of the world. As a consequence quantum the-
ory is often presented as non-causal.1 The identification of causality and
determinism was rather universal: even those who regretted the demise of
a causal picture attempted to restore a causal understanding of quantum
mechanics precisely by restoring determinism. For instance, David Bohm
showed Von Neumann’s theorem against hidden variables to involve essen-
tially questionable premises, thus paving the way for hidden variables. But
while Bohm and Von Neumann disagreed regarding the status of causation
in quantum mechanics, they agreed that the fortunes of causation and de-
terminism were essentially linked. Bohm’s theory is in essence a programme
to endow quantum mechanics with an underlying deterministic dynamics.
The identification causality = determinism (let us call it the “c=d iden-
tity”) has continued in different, not always explicit, guises. For example
Bell’s theorem and the work leading up to it during the 1960’s presupposes
the notorious factorizability condition as a criterion of local causality. Fac-
torizability is applicable to the correlations between measurement outcomes
of spatially separated systems in EPR like set ups. Bell’s theorem demon-
strated that no “factorizable” theory can reproduce the quantum correla-
tions. It is thus concluded that Bell’s work shows that not only quantum
mechanics but any other empirically indistinguishable theory would be non-
causal in this sense. But philosophers have shown that Bell’s theorem does
not entail a departure from the c=d identity. Some brilliant work by philoso-
phers of physics in the early 1980’s showed that the factorizability condition
implies determinism when applied to the EPR perfect anti-correlations.2 So
in the end it turns out that the rejection of local causality promoted by
Bell’s theorem also presupposes a rejection of determinism, and is hence
compatible with the c=d identity.
Many physicists have continued to presuppose the c=d identity, some-
times unquestioningly so. Philosophers of science by contrast long ago
started to work out the details of a stochastic view of causality. On this
view causation is essentially probabilistic association, and hence suppos-
edly divorced from determinism. One of the earliest and most influential
attempts is Hans Reichenbach’s The Direction of Time, where the Princi-
ple of the Common Cause (PCC) is first stated. The programme gains its
full and most developed expression in Patrick Suppes’ epoch-making 1970
1See Heisenberg (Heisenberg, 1958) and Von Neumann (Von Neumann, 1955).
2See (Fine, 1982b; Fine, 1982a) and (Van Fraassen, 1982). The original theorems are
due to Suppes and Zanotti (Suppes and Zanotti, 1981).
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book, A Probabilistic Theory of Causality. In spite of the fact that these were
both explicit attempts at building a stochastic theory of causality, it remains
controversial just how much they depart as a matter of fact from the c=d
identity. In particular regarding the PCC some philosophers have gone on
to argue that the assumption of screening-off is only valid for deterministic,
or quasi-deterministic common causes, but does not hold for probabilistic
causes. Hence philosophers have for a very long time now considered that
the c=d identity is controversial, although they have disagreed among them-
selves as to whether it should be rejected altogether, or weakened in some
interesting sense.3
The disagreement over rejection vs. weakening goes a long way to ex-
plaining why the status of causation in quantum mechanics also remains
controversial. A weak version of the c=d identity is at the heart of a con-
dition that was widely discussed among philosophers of physics in the early
1990’s in connection with the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen correlations, namely
Michael Redhead’s robustness. The consensus reached then was by and
large that robustness is too strong a condition on probabilistic causality. So
the failure of robustness in the EPR set up is uninformative, and a causal
account of the EPR correlations remains an open option.
The current debate on causal inference has moved to a discussion of the
Causal Markov Condition (CMC), a sophisticated version of the PCC for
directed acyclic graphs.4 The condition employs a similarly weak version
of the c=d identity, and remains equally controversial. But it has not been
systematically applied to the EPR case, nor has the connection been made
explicit to the robustness condition discussed in the early 1990’s. Our main
aim in this paper is to make an explicit link between CMC and robustness
in the context of the EPR correlations. Thus we aim to show that the
application of CMC to the EPR correlations is exactly as informative (or
uninformative, depending on taste) as robustness. Both conditions hold
or fail for the same types of systems. So a defender of the weak version
of the c=d identity will find the failure of both CMC and robustness in
the EPR correlations revealing of a striking failure of causality in quantum
mechanics —and there is a sense in which this result vindicates the founding
parents’ suspicion that the probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics is
what underlies the failure of causality. But those who are inclined to reject
the c=d identity altogether are likely to draw rather the opposite lesson:
the failure of CMC and robustness is precisely what is to be expected given
the probabilistic nature of quantum mechanical causation. Although there
is thus no essential superiority, in the context of the EPR correlations, to
discussing CMC over robustness we aim to show that the application of
3And several philosophers have gone as far as to defend that causality and determinism
in fact exclude each other. See (Hoefer, 2004) for a recent example.
4Cf. (Hausman and Woodward, 1999), (Cartwright, 2002) and (Steel, 2005).
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CMC is sharper and less cumbersome. Thus we shall urge that the debate
over the causal status of the EPR correlations is best continued in the new
terms laid down by the Causal Markov Condition.
2 EPR and Quantum Correlations
Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen first introduced the so-called EPR thought
experiment in 19355 as an argument to suggest that the then young and
emergent quantum theory did not provide a complete description of reality.
In a later refined version presented by David Bohm, two entangled electrons
are emitted from a source in opposite directions. The spin component of each
of the electrons can be later detected (measured) when the electrons hit a
fluorescent screen after having passed through an inhomogeneous magnetic
field (produced by a Stern-Gerlach magnet).
Several features of this experiment are potentially relevant. First, we will
denote by a and b the value of the spin variable of each electron which, in the
singlet state, can be either ‘spin-up’ (↑) or ‘spin-down’ (↓) with probability
1
2 . We can then denote the corresponding measurement outcome events on
each particle as ↑a, ↓a, ↑b and ↓b. Second, it is assumed that the state of
the entangled electron pair is the singlet state:
Ψ =
1√
2
(|↑a〉 |↓b〉− |↓a〉 |↑b〉)
Third, it is assumed that measurement events at each wing of the ex-
periment, such as ↑a and ↓b, are space-like separated events, i.e. lie outside
each other’s light cone. This is best represented in the above diagram as the
statement that no time-like world-line can reach from b to a or vice versa.
Under a conventional albeit controversial interpretation of special relativity,
such events can not be causally connected.6
Quantum mechanics allows us to calculate conditional and joint prob-
abilities for the different possible outcomes on both wings. When those
calculations are performed on the entangled pair in the singlet state, corre-
lations between these outcomes are derived. The EPR correlations between
the different outcome events in both wings of the experiment can be suc-
cinctly expressed as:
p(a ∧ b) 6= p(a) · p(b)
These are the EPR correlations, which have been often positively tested
in experiment, and for which we would like to know whether they are the
result of underlying causal processes, and which processes. An attempt to
determine an answer to these questions was carried out in the late 1980’s
by the distinguished British philosopher of physics Michael Redhead.
5(Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen, 1935).
6See (Maudlin, 1994) for a critical discussion.
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Figure 1: Spacetime representation of a typical EPR experiment.
3 Redhead’s Robustness
Redhead introduced his Robustness condition in 19877 in order to argue that
no direct causal relation could be established between the outcome events
of an EPR-type experiment. The claim was part of Redhead’s attempt
at showing that quantum mechanics and relativity can peacefully coexist.
Under the presumption that only timelike related events can be causally
connected, the measurement outcome events a and b in an EPR experiment
can not be causally connected. In particular, Redhead suggested that the
EPR correlations were not what he called robust causal connections. This
in turn entitled him to discard direct causal links between EPR correlated
events:8
“A stochastic causal connection between two physical magni-
tudes a and b pertaining to two separated systems A and B is
said to be robust if and only if there exist a class of sufficiently
small disturbances acting on B(A) such that b(a) screens off a(b)
from these disturbances.
Denoting the disturbance action on B by d, then the first part
of this condition can be rendered formally as
∃D(∀d ∈ D[p(a = ²a|b = ²b ∧ d) = p(a = ²a|b = ²b)])
A similar condition can be written down for disturbances acting
on A. The requirement of robustness as a necessary condition
for a causal relation means that sufficiently small disturbances
of either relata do not affect the causal relation.”
7(Redhead, 1987).
8(Redhead, 1987, pp. 102-3).
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Figure 2: Redhead’s Robustness for EPR correlations.
The intuition that underlies Redhead’s robustness is both simple and
powerful, and is best brought out by a simplified version of the condition.
We can say in general that a stochastic causal link between two quantities
a and b is robust if and only if the statistical relation p(a|b) is invariant
under small disturbances d acting on the putative cause b. In other words
b is a robust cause of a if and only if p(a|b ∧ d) = p(a|b). In other words,
the intuition behind Redhead’s robustness is that it does not matter to the
causal link between b and a how the putative cause b comes about, only that
it does so (see figure 2).
It is worth mentioning that initially Redhead apparently took robustness
to be both necessary and sufficient for a causal link, but in response to criti-
cism he weakened this to a necessary condition only.9 In any case robustness
is understood to be at least a necessary condition on a causal link —so it be-
comes superfluous to speak of a robust causal link, since no link that fails to
be robust can on this understanding be causal: There is no such a thing as a
non-robust causal link. The double terminology points already to what will
be the heart of the problem. For Redhead defines robustness as a statistical
condition. Hence “robust causal link” is really a heterogeneous combination
of a statistical condition and a causal relation. In stating that robustness
is a necessary condition on a causal link Redhead is stipulating that the
presence of the causal relation always necessarily implies the statistical con-
dition. So there is a necessary statistical consequence of the existence of
a causal relation. As we shall see the critics of robustness quickly pointed
out that the statistical condition was not general enough to cover all kinds
of probabilistic causes, but rather entailed a particular pseudo-deterministic
assumption on the working of the cause. The situation is entirely analogous
in the recent debate over the Causal Markov Condition.
9For a discussion see (Healey, 1992b).
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4 Healey on Robustness
The publication of Redhead’s work on robustness attracted considerable
attention and gave rise to an engaging debate on causation in quantum
mechanics in general and in EPR in particular. One of the staunchest critics
of robustness is Richard Healey, who discussed and criticised the condition
at length in two papers published in the early 1990’s10 In these papers
Healey cast doubts upon the validity of robustness as a criterion for causal
inference. His arguments are designed to show that robustness is not a
necessary condition in general for a causal link. Our thesis in this paper
is that in the context of the EPR correlations the debate over the Causal
Markov Condition recapitulates the debate over robustness, so it is worth
reviewing the latter in a little detail.
Healey first pointed out that robustness, as defined by Redhead (see
section 3), can only be taken to be a necessary condition on total causes.
In other words, robustness can only be a necessary condition on a causal
link between b and a as long as no other causes are operating on a (see
figure 2).11
In order to deal with cases in which b is only a partial cause of a, Healey
introduced a new condition, which he called Internal Robustness:12
“A stochastic relation between two events h, k is internally ro-
bust just in case p(h|k) is invariant under all (sufficiently small)
modifications in the causal antecedents of k that leave k fixed
and preserve independent causal antecedents of h.”
We may rephrase this condition in our terminology as follows. A stochas-
tic causal link between a and b is internally robust if and only if the statistical
relation p(a|b) is invariant under small disturbances d which leave b and all
the independent causal antecedents of a fixed. That is a stochastic causal
link between quantities a and b is internally robust iff p(a|b∧d∧c) = p(a|b∧c)
and d does not causally affect c, where c is the set of all independent causal
antecedents of a.
Healey finds both conditions problematic as criteria for causal inference:
robustness is problematic because we are very rarely in a position to know
that b is the total cause of a, and so a violation of robustness in practice
will say nothing informative about whether or not there is a direct causal
link between a and b. Robustness may fail because b does not cause a, but
it may also fail because we are not accounting for a third partial cause c of
a. More specifically in the quantum case it is impossible to know whether
10(Healey, 1992a; Healey, 1992b).
11We will not here assess this claim, since the aim of the paper is not to evaluate but to
compare robustness and the Causal Markov Condition, and to show that they face similar
difficulties and challenges.
12(Healey, 1992b, pp. 183-4).
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Figure 3: Healey’s Internal Robustness.
the measurement outcome event b in one wing is the only cause of the
measurement outcome event a in the other wing, and hence impossible to
know in advance whether a failure of robustness implies no causal relation
between b and a or is simply due to the presence of third causes. Similarly
for internal robustness: we are never in a position to know whether the
small disturbances on b have in fact no causal effect upon some of the causal
antecedents of a other than b. So as a criterion for causal inference internal
robustness is just as unhelpful: a failure of internal robustness might mean
that b is not even a partial cause of a, but it might also mean that there
are other unaccounted partial causes of a besides b that are in turn effects
of causes of b.
Redhead’s response to these criticisms was to assert that “at some stage
in the process of incorporating antecedents in the total cause, robustness
must be rescued. Otherwise we would live in a ‘marshmallow’ world where
the notion of cause would not, I believe, be appropriate.”13 In other words,
whatever our cognitive and epistemic limitations, a causal relation is prop-
erly causal only if robust in actual fact when all other causes have been
accounted for. So in other words Redhead’s most considered view is that
while robustness is not helpful in general as a criterion for positive causal
inference, its failure nonetheless allows some minimal negative causal in-
ference. In the EPR case this allows him to say at least that a failure of
robustness between the outcome events on both wings b and a definitely
implies that b is not the total or only cause of a. Redhead identified robust
causality with action at a distance, and distinguished it from what Abner
Shimony14 called passion at a distance, a kind of nomic acausal stochastic
link between variables that are “holistically” implicated —whatever that
13(Redhead, 1987, p. vi).
14(Shimony, 1984).
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might mean. The application of the robustness condition to the EPR set
up was designed to show that quantum phenomena exhibits passion rather
than action at a distance. This in turn was argued to be enough to warrant
peaceful coexistence with special relativity.
The critics of robustness did not rest content at this point however, but
went on to argue against robustness as a necessary condition on causation
in general.15 In other words, they came to dispute the very idea that causal
links are Markovian in the way specified by either robustness or internal
robustness. However, our aim in this paper is not to evaluate robustness and
internal robustness as necessary conditions on total and partial causes; so
we will not review this debate. Our main aim here is to more modestly show
that robustness in the EPR case follows logically from the Causal Markov
Condition. We consequently argue that discussion regarding causality in
EPR is best conducted in terms of the CMC.
5 The Causal Markov Condition
The Causal Markov Condition (CMC) is inspired by the Principle of the
Common Cause (PCC) and is a keystone and crucial assumption in the
most powerful contemporary programs of causal inference. It is intended as
a generalised version of the PCC and can be defined, following Hausman
and Woodward, as follows:16
Causal Markov Condition (CMC): For all distinct variables
X and Y in the variable set V, if X does not cause Y then
p(X|Y ∧ Par(X)) = p(X|Par(X)),
where Par(X) (read parents of X ) is the set of all direct causes
of X in V.
The Causal Markov Condition is an extrapolation of the PCC to directed
acyclic graphs. The PCC states that a common cause screens-off its effects
from each other, as long as there are no direct causal links between these
effects. The CMC more generally states that the parents of X (Par(X))
screen-off X from any other variable Y in the variable set V that is not
causally connected with X. In short: if X and Y in V are causally inde-
pendent, then Par(X) will screen them off. The contraposition is rather
useful in the EPR set up: if the putative parent of one of the measurement
outcome events, say a, does not screen it off from the other outcome event
b then it follows that either a and b are causally connected, or we have not
identified the only putative parent. In the EPR scenario it is often assumed
15(Healey, 1992a; Healey, 1992b) and (Cartwright and Jones, 1991).
16See (Hausman and Woodward, 1999, p. 523).
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that the only putative parent of the measurement outcome events is the sin-
glet state at the source; while the two events can not be causally connected
because of the relativistic constraints. So the residual correlation between
the events a and b which does not disappear when CMC is applied, must be
accounted by some rather mysterious nomic and acausal mechanism.17 This
of course is very much in line with Readhead’s thought that underlying the
EPR correlations are non-robust stochastic links that are unthreatening to
special relativity. It will not then come as a surprise that there is a strong
formal connection between the CMC and the robustness conditions.
6 Robustness and the Causal Markov Condition
We show in this section that robustness is indeed a consequence of applying
the Causal Markov Condition to an EPR setting. In fact we show this for
both of Healey’s conditions by simply applying the Causal Markov Condition
to total and partial causes respectively.
6.1 Total Causes and the Causal Markov Condition
Let us first consider robustness. Let us suppose that b is the total cause of
a. In this case b is the set of all parents of a. That is,
(i) If b is the total cause of a, then Par(a) = b
Now let us turn to the definition of the Causal Markov Condition CMC
given in the previous section. By substitution we can write:
(ii) p(a|Y ∧ Par(a)) = p(a|Par(a))
Let us now substitute in for the term Y the sufficiently small disturbances
that robustness refers to. That is, let us set:
(iii) Y = d.
It then follows from (i) that:
p(a|d ∧ b) = p(a|b),
which is an explicit expression of robustness. Thus we have formally shown
that
(Total Cause) ∧ (Causal Markov) ⇒ (Robustness).
In other words robustness is the consequence of applying the Causal
Markov Condition to total causes.
17See (Hausman and Woodward, 1999, pp. 564-7) and (Hausman, 1999).
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6.2 Internal Robustness, Partial Causes and the Causal Mar-
kov Condition
Now let us turn to internal robustness and partial causes. Let us then sup-
pose that b is a partial cause of a. It follows that there is a non-empty
set of additional variables c that represent all other independent causal an-
tecedents of a. Let us simplify by bringing them all under an additional
variable c in the causal graph. Then the complete set of parents of a in the
graph is the union of c and b:
(i) If b is partial cause of a, then: Par(a) = {b, c}
Once again we can write by substitution into the definition of the Causal
Markov Condition (CMC) in Section 5:
(ii) p(a|Y ∧ Par(a)) = p(a|Par(a))
And again we identify the small disturbances d with Y to find:
(iii) Y = d.
So now we can substitute (i) and (iii) into (ii) in order to find:
p(a|d ∧ b ∧ c) = p(a|b ∧ c),
which is Healey’s internal robustness. Thus we have formally shown that
(Partial Cause) ∧ (Causal Markov) ⇒ (Internal Robustness).
6.3 Robustness updated
We have shown that robustness and internal robustness are consequences of
applying the Causal Markov Condition to the measurement outcome events
a and b. If b is taken to be a total cause of a then the CMC alone entails
robustness. If on the other hand b is taken to be merely a partial cause
of a then the CMC entails internal robustness. So it seems that the intu-
ition underlining Michael Redhead’s conditions is as a matter of fact the
Causal Markov Condition. And the contrary intuitions and arguments by
their critics are conversely related to doubts regarding the Causal Markov
Condition. To the extent that the CMC is doubtful so will be Redhead’s
conditions. And if the CMC is false as many recent critics believe18, then
robustness is fatally compromised. The failure of robustness in EPR estab-
lished by Redhead would be without any consequences were it not backed
up by the CMC.
Moreover we have shown that a failure of Redhead’s conditions entails a
failure of the CMC regardless of whether the putative link is taken to be a
18(Cartwright, 2002) and (Williamson, 2005).
11
total or a partial cause. So the distinction between total and partial causes
that seemed so important in the early 1990’s now seems irrelevant. The
Causal Markov Condition is what underlies Redhead’s intuition regardless.
Similarly Healey’s subtle distinctions between kinds of robustness are now
seen to be irrelevant for a proper assessment of the causal nature of the
EPR correlations. The peaceful coexistence between quantum mechanics
and relativity so sought after by philosophers in the early 1990’s is to be
achieved always at the cost of a violation of the CMC, regardless of the
underlying causal structure. So philosophers of physics interested in the
issue of coexistence would be well adviced to turn to a careful and detailed
analysis of the implications of the CMC to the EPR correlations. This is
essentially the central claim of our paper, and we find it remarkable that it
needs to be made. But indeed it does —such an analysis has not yet been
carried out. We can at best find the outlines in the very brief discussion
of EPR in Hausman and Woodward19, and in a a recent paper by Daniel
Steel20.
7 EPR and the Causal Markov Condition
It has been claimed (for example by Salmon21) that many genuinely statis-
tical phenomena violate the PCC. Most prominently the EPR correlations
are supposed to provide a set of established correlations that can not be
explained by either a direct cause or a common cause model under the stric-
tures of PCC.22
Yet an important part of Hausman and Woodward’s defence of CMC
is that EPR is no counterexample.23 They do not claim that the CMC is
satisfied by the EPR correlations, but rather that it is inapplicable: it is
neither satisfied nor violated, simply inappropriate. The discussion inter-
estingly brings out some crucial differences between on the one hand the
PCC as usually understood and on the other the CMC and the robustness
conditions. So we review it briefly here.
7.1 Causal Markov, Interventions and Modularity
The key difference between the usual statement of the PCC and the CMC is
the assumption of independence that, according to Hausman and Woodward
19(Hausman and Woodward, 1999).
20(Steel, 2005).
21(Salmon, 1984, Ch. 7).
22One of us has argued against this common lore (Sua´rez, 2007). However, these argu-
ments do not vindicate the PCC as usually stated but a very different reformulation. We
will not review this literature here, but instead refer the reader to that paper.
23See (Hausman, 1999) and (Hausman and Woodward, 1999).
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underlies and motivates CMC. This is best expressed in the modularity
condition:24
Modularity (MOD): For all subsets Z or the variable set V,
there is some non-empty range R of values of members of Z
such that if one intervenes and sets the value of the members of
Z within R, then all equations except those with a member of Z
as dependent variable (if there is one) remain invariant.
Hausman and Woodward take this condition, in conjunction with some
others, to provide the grounds for the CMC. The setV is the set of variables
in the causal graph, and the equations are the linear regression equations
that characterise a causal system. Modularity as a condition on causal sys-
tems is then the plausible thought that a relation between two quantities a
and b is causal only if (i) it is possible at least in principle to intervene in
order to set the values of a and b and their probabilities, and (ii) these inter-
ventions —as long as within a permissible range— leave intact the functional
connections between the values of a and b, or their probabilities.25
The statement of MOD is a conditional with an antecedent that may be
false, so a truth-functional interpretation as a material implication would
entail that MOD is true by default in all such cases. But the context of the
discussion suggests that MOD is meant to be non-applicable rather than
false. That is, if interventions are possible in some set V and equations do
not remain invariant then modularity is false. But if, on the other hand,
interventions are not possible for some subset Z of V then MOD is strictly
speaking not false but non-applicable.
Regardless of whether MOD is meant or not as a truth-functional ma-
terial implication, it certainly is the case that when interventions are not
possible the CMC is non-applicable rather than false. There is in fact some
redundancy in Hausman and Woodward’s proof of the equivalence between
MOD and CMC, which ensures that this is the case. It is related to the
additional conditions required to show MOD and CMC equivalent, which
include (i) causal sufficiency i.e. that all common causes are included in
the set V, (ii) the assumption that all correlations have causal explanation,
and (iii) the assumption that there exist unrepresented causes which can
play the role of interventions. There is no need to get into the details of the
proof, although it is worth mentioning that it has been contested.26 In this
paper we assume for the sake of argument that the proof is valid, and that
a failure of CMC entails a failure of either of these conditions.
24(Hausman and Woodward, 1999, p. 545).
25The qualification of values or probabilities is needed to account for probabilistic
causality, which Hausman and Woodward define as deterministic causation of probabili-
ties (Hausman and Woodward, 1999, p. 570).
26See e.g. (Cartwright, 2002).
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This has consequences for the discussion of the EPR correlations as we
shall see. It also distinguishes subtly CMC from the usual statement of the
PCC. For the PCC makes no implicit or explicit reference to interventions.
By contrast, the notion of “disturbance” required by robustness is clearly
akin to an intervention. Hence a system that allows no interventions at
all on any of its variables even in principle might violate the PCC without
violating either CMC or robustness.27 This is the line defended by Hausman
and Hausman andWoordward with respect to the EPR correlations.28 Their
argument is essentially that there is no possible way to intervene on either
of the distant measurement events. Consequently it is impossible in this
set-up to evaluate the CMC: the EPR correlations can not be shown to be
a counterexample.
7.2 Interventions in EPR
The main aim of this paper is to urge that the debate over possible causal ex-
planations of the EPR correlations ought to move to a detailed discussion of
the CMC and its presuppositions in the context of the EPR experiment. We
believe we have already achieved this aim —it follows from the equivalence
proof in Section 6. Hence the paper so far may be taken as endorsement
of Hausman and Woodward’s impressive framework, and its suitability re-
garding quantum phenomena. However, in this final section we outline our
disagreement with the particular conclusions that they draw concerning the
EPR correlations.
The crucial issue is whether interventions are possible in the EPR con-
text. Hausman and Woodward endorse the view that in the EPR set up
there are no distinct mechanisms in the wings of the experiment because
in fact there are no different systems to speak of. Both entangled particles
are just ‘parts’ of the same irreducible holistic or nonseparable system.29
Together with the fact that there is no way to control the outcome of the
first measurement this indeed seems to entail that interventions to set the
values of the outcome events a and b, separately or jointly, are impossible.
However, we have already noted that both MOD and CMC are explicitly
stated as conditions on either values or probabilities of variables in the
variable setV. In cases of genuine probabilitistic causation the only relevant
27The observation is consistent with our results in the previous section, since we showed
that CMC entails robustness but not that modularity entails robustness —the main dif-
ference is clear now.
28See (Hausman, 1999) and (Hausman and Woodward, 1999).
29They refer extensively to an old paper by Skyrms that defends this view (Skyrms,
1984); it is worth mentioning that the literature on EPR has moved on a very great deal
in the last two decades, particuarly on the physics side. Quantum entanglement was not
then the area of intense research among physicists that it has become now, and Skyrms’
views were much more entrenched twenty five years ago than they are now among both
physicists and philosophers.
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factor are the probabilities of the variables, since the causal structure fails
to determine the values themselves. And it is of course well known that
deterministic hidden variables are ruled out for quantum mechanics by the
Bell inequalities. Hence the EPR correlations are potentially a paradigm
but subtle case of probabilistic causality.
Interventions are not impossible to set the probabilities of some of these
outcomes in the appropriate circumstances. For notice that the experimenter
controls the settings of the measurement apparata that determine the di-
rection of spin that gets meausured on each wing. Let us refer to the two
wings of the experiment and their corresponding particles as ‘1’ and ‘2’. It
is true that the spherical symmetry of the singlet state entails that the first
measurement outcome in the laboratory rest frame always has probability
one half, regardless of what direction one measures spin along. Suppose
then that in that frame spin is measured on ‘1’ first, and suppose the out-
come correspoding to ‘spin-up’ is found. If this information is provided to
the second experimenter on time to set the direction of spin measured on
particle ‘2’ she can then easily set her measurement device to definitely get
the outcome corresponding to ‘spin-down’ with probability one (or indeed
any other probability but zero). For any value of probability of ‘spin-down’
on particle ‘2’ she can use quantum mechanics to calculate the appropriate
direction of measurement and set her device accordingly.
So it turns out that interventions are possible in particular experimental
EPR setups. In such setups the question is then whether MOD and CMC
hold. We urge in this paper that this is the relevant question to ask for
causal modellers of EPR; but we will not attempt a comprehensive answer
here. The answer is complicated and depends on the details of the causal
hypotheses under test.30 A brief and intuitive argument suggests that CMC
may fail here. The EPR correlations are not screened-off by the creation
event at the source. Similarly the value of the setting of the measurement
device on ‘2’ will not screen-off the outcome event in that wing from the
outcome event in the distant wing. But this really says nothing about a
direct causal link between the wings. And if CMC failed for indeterministic
systems, as some authors argue, then a common cause structure underlying
the direct cause link would also be possible, which means that CMC might
fail for a and b too. However, this claim requires further investigation in
the context of alternative causal hypotheses. For our purposes in this paper
this is a side issue, since whatever the correct answer it will already show
that CMC is applicable to the EPR correlations in spite of Hausman and
Woodward’s claims to the contrary.
30For a preliminary account see (Cartwright and Sua´rez, 2000).
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7.3 Causal Markov and Other Interpretations
The argument we have just given shows that in any EPR experiment there
always exists a subset of the relevant variables that are susceptible to inter-
vention. This leaves open several causal accounts for the EPR correlations.
The fate of the CMC very much depends on the details of each account.
But we believe that a stronger claim can be made. So far we have been
assuming the standard or orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics.
So we have assumed that the violation of the Bell inequalities in the EPR
experiments is due to a failure of what is known as outcome independence,
and correspodingly that the only possible causes of each measurement out-
come event are the distant outcome event and the proximate measurement
device setting event.
In other words we have assumed that it is meaningless to suppose that
the setting events in each wing can be a causal influence upon the dis-
tant outcome events. But it is well known that on some interpretations of
quantum mechanics this is essentially what happens. The paradigm case
is Bohm’s theory. On the account of the EPR correlations provided in
Bohmian mechanics,31 the actual measurement outcome event on one wing
has no influence upon the measurement outcome event on the other wing,
because in Bohm’s theory measurements simply reveal values that are al-
ready there, they do not bring these values into being. Yet the setting of
the distant device does have a causal influence, since it affects the quantum
wavefunction of both particles in configuration space, and thus causally af-
fects the probabilities for outcomes in the distant wing. The distant setting
does not determine the proximate outcome of course, which also depends
on the initial wavefunction state and the initial spin of both particles. Now
since both measurement setting events are controllable by the experimenter,
as is the initial state, it turns out that in Bohm’s theory all the variables in
the set V are susceptible to intervention. The presuppositions of CMC ob-
tain and we can now go on to ask whether CMC holds in Bohm’s description
of EPR.
Daniel Steel32 has claimed that Bohm’s theory shows that CMC can fail
for deterministic systems. The claim is part of a larger argument in the
debate over whether the CMC is satisfied only by deterministic, or more
generally ‘pseudo-deterministic’, systems.33 Steel argues that the key to the
validity of the CMC is not whether the system is deterministic or pseudo-
31See (Bohm and Hiley, 1993, pp.147-151) and (Holland, 1993, ch.7).
32(Steel, 2005).
33By pseudo deterministic system we mean a system with causes that do not fix the
ocurrence of all their effects, but that can nonetheless be “embedded in another more
complete graph [...] in which the parents of the given effect are sufficient to fix the value
of the effect”. (Cartwright, 1999). For a discussion and a reference to the notorious cheap
but dirty factory example of the presumed failure of CMC in indeterministic systems see
(Cartwright, 1993).
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deterministic but rather whether there are exogenous variables that are in-
herently random and hence not susceptible to intervention. Bohm’s theory
is an important part of the argument because it is the only example that
Steel provides of a deterministic system that does not satisfy CMC. Presum-
ably, given Steel’s argument, this must be the case because there are some
exogenous random variables in Bohm’s description of EPR. Steel’s overall
argument is in line with Hausman and Woodward’s proof of the equivalence
of MOD and CMC. But since it is not the aim of this paper to debate the
general validity of CMC we will not assess the general argument. We are
interested though in assessing the chances of CMC for the EPR correlations.
And we conjecture that the fate of the CMC in EPR is extremely sensitive
to both the details of the causal hypothesis under test and the interpretation
of quantum mechanics that is adopted.
So does the Bohmian description of the EPR correlations violate CMC?
Steel assumes that it does since it predicts the very same EPR correlations.
As he writes:
[. . . ] the EPR example is a problematic basis for the claim that
the CMC is a more reliable assumption for deterministic than in-
deterministic systems for the simple reason that there is a fully
deterministic (though heterodox) interpretation of quantum me-
chanics, namely Bohm’s. Bohm’s quantum theory predicts pre-
cisely the same non-local (and hence putatively non-causal) cor-
relations in the EPR example as the standard, indeterministic
interpretation. Hence it is far from clear that the blame for the
(putative) counter-example can be laid at the door of indeter-
minism.
In our view this makes the very mistake to suppose that the fate of
the CMC is independent of the details of the causal hypothesis under test.
For on Bohm’s theory (also often referred to as the causal interpretation),
the causal structure is rather different and hence there is no real reason to
expect CMC’s fate to be the same as in orthodox quantum mechanics. On
the contrary we would like to argue that the Bohmian description of EPR
definitely satisfies the CMC, and that this is precisely so because of the
underlying determinism of the theory.
We have already noted that in the EPR experiment as described by
Bohm the measurement outcome events do not cause each other, but the
setting events have a causal influence upon the outcomes. In fact the under-
lying determinism of the theory implies that the setting events are instan-
taneous partial causes of the values of spin of the distant particles, which
are only later revealed by measurement, if there ever is one, on the distant
wing. So my setting the measurement device of particle ‘1’ partially deter-
mines not just the probability of an outcome of a measurement on particle
‘2’ —it actually partially determines its value. The reason is that particles
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on Bohm’s theory have well defined values of their dynamical variables at all
times —so the EPR particles have a value of position and spin from the word
go, as they are ejected from the source.34 This value can change though at
any time, and in the case of an entagled particles as in the EPR case, it
might do so non-locally as a result of changes in the wavefunction. And
the wavefunction is responsive not only to the values of the distant entan-
gled particles but also to the features of the systems those distant particles
interact with. Thus although essentially non-local, Bohm’s theory is also
essentially causal, in the strong sense of the c=d identity that we mentioned
in the introduction.
How do we evaluate CMC then? Since measurement outcomes a and b
are not causes, we can apply CMC fully as follows:
Causal Markov Condition (CMC) for Bohm’s theory:
For measurement outcome events a and b, since a does not cause
b then
p(a|b ∧ Par(a)) = p(a|Par(a)),
where Par(a) is the set of all direct causes of a in V.
There is absolutely no reason to suspect that in Bohm’s theory this con-
dition is false. On the contrary, since in Bohm’s theory the explicit causal
antecedents of the measurement outcomes include the quantum wavefunc-
tion, the initial complete states of both particles and the distant settings,
it follows that Par (a) includes all these. And since these variables jointly
determine the value of the outcomes a and b, they jointly determine their
probabilities. So the CMC is trivially satisfied in the Bohmian description
of the EPR correlations, as long as we include in the set V all those vari-
ables that according to the theory are effectively causal antecedents of the
outcomes a and b.
8 Conclusions
Our aim in this paper has been to urge more research to be conducted on
applying the Causal Markov Condition to the diverse models and interpre-
tations of the EPR correlations. We hope to have shown that questions
regarding the causal nature of explanations of the EPR correlations are best
explored by means of a detailed and careful analysis of the application of the
CMC. This is the right framework to update the debate regarding Michael
Redhead’s robustness in the early 1990’s and to generally conduct the de-
bate. Despite claims to the contrary the answers are not trivial, and the
CMC is in principle applicable to the EPR correlation phenomena. But
34We are here glossing over very complicated details in Bohmian mechanics’ understand-
ing of spin, which is far from the orthodoxy —for details see (Bohm and Hiley, 1993).
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questions remain as to whether CMC is satisfied by these phenomena. We
conjecture that the answer to this question is highly sensitive to the details
of the causal hypothesis under test. We have also claimed it to be sensitive
to the interpretation of quantum mechanics that is adopted, a claim that
we have supported by looking at the Bohmian description of the EPR ex-
periment. Contrary to recent claims the Bohmian description of the EPR
correlations satisfies CMC.
This suggests that the CMC is always valid for deterministic or pseudo-
deterministic systems. It remains to be seen whether it is also valid for
indeterministic ones such as EPR on the orthodox interpretation of quan-
tum mechanics. Concomittantly it also remains to be seen whether a causal
understanding of indeterministic phenomena requires the CMC. Suppose
that CMC fails for at least some of the main causal hypotheses for the
EPR correlations under the standard or orthodox understanding. If CMC
is not required for causation then even the weakest interpretation of the
c=d identity will have been refuted. If on the other hand CMC is required
for causation then quantum mechanical phenomena, on the orthodox in-
terpretation at least, abandons causality as well as determinism, the c=d
identity is retained, and the intuition of the founding parents is proved cor-
rect (for orthodox quantum mechanics at least). The questions are relevant,
the stakes are high, and the answers should be informative.
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